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Introduction
In May 2003, the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) dispute panel ruled that US 
steel safeguards imposed in March 2002 
are illegal. The WTO Appellate Body is all 
but  certain  to  confirm  the  panel’s  judg-
ment, probably by December 2003. Then 
the Bush administration will face an im-
portant choice. It can keep the safeguards 
in  place,  pleasing  steel  producers  and 
important constituencies in West Virginia, 
Pennsylvania,  and  Ohio.  However,  doing 
so  would  further  anger  steel  users,  who 
have probably lost more business and jobs 
as a direct consequence of the safeguards 
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than steel producers have gained.1 Main-
taining the safeguards would also send a 
signal to the world’s trading nations that 
the United States is not prepared to en-
dure the political cost of eliminating steel 
protection.  Furthermore,  the  administra-
tion would run the risk that, in the middle 
of  a  presidential  election  season,  foreign 
countries will exercise their rights under 
the WTO to retaliate.
Alternatively, the Bush administration 
can revoke the steel safeguards soon after 
the  Appellate  Body  rules  and  before  the 
presidential  election  cycle  is  full  swing. 
This choice would eliminate an unfair tax 
on steel users. It would send a powerful 
signal  to  the  world  trading  community, 
uplifting  spirits  after  the  failed  Cancún 
ministerial meeting, and avert the politi-
cal embarrassment of trade retaliation in 
the middle of a presidential election year. 
At the same time, revoking the steel safe-
guards  could  complicate  the  already  dif-
ficult  task  of  securing  congressional  ap-
proval of the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA) in mid-2004.
1 Later in this policy brief, we evaluate the balance 
between losses to steel users and gains to steel pro-
ducers. By way of a preview, in Hufbauer and Go-
odrich (2003b), we estimated that 26,000 jobs would 
be lost in steel-consuming industries during the first 
12 months after tariffs were imposed. Francois and 
Baughman (2001) estimated that steel tariffs would 
cause a net loss of 74,500 jobs. USITC (2003b, table 
4-3) used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model to estimate that safeguards had decreased the 
capital income (i.e., earnings) of steel users by $601 
million but had increased the capital income of steel 
producers by only $240 million.Number PB03-10 October 2003 2
Box 1. Timeline of steel safeguard saga
June 2001: President Bush asks the US International 
Trade Commission (USITC) to conduct a global safe-
guard investigation for 33 types of steel imports. The 
Senate Finance Committee duplicates this request.
October 2001: The USITC finds that imports are a sub-
stantial cause of serious injury to a segment of the US 
steel industry for 16 out of the 33 types of steel imports 
under investigation. In the finding, however, 5 types 
of steel imports are grouped into the single catchall 
category of flat-rolled steel, so only 12 product catego-
ries are eligible for safeguard remedies. For many of the 
steel products found to injure the US industry, imports 
from Canada and Mexico are found to contribute impor-
tantly to the injury.
December 2001: The six USITC commissioners provide 
remedy recommendations to President Bush. Two, Lynn 
Bragg and Dennis Devaney, recommend prohibitive 
tariffs (generally 30 to 40 percent). Three commission-
ers—Jennifer Hillman, Stephen Koplan, and Marcia 
Miller—recommend moderate tariffs (generally 10 to 20 
percent). Commissioner Deanna Okun generally recom-
mends moderate quotas. The commissioners suggest 
that imports from Canada and Mexico be excluded from 
the remedies.
January 2002: US Trade Representative Robert Zoel-
lick writes a supplementary letter to the USITC asking 
several questions, most importantly whether the injury 
findings would be changed if steel imports from Canada 
and Mexico had been excluded from consideration. The 
commissioners respond that their injury findings would 
not have been affected.
March 2002: President Bush orders relief for 10 of 
the 12 categories of steel imports.1 Imports from US 
partners in free trade agreements—Canada, Mexico, 
Israel, and Jordan—are excluded from coverage. Also 
excluded are imports from developing countries that 
individually supply small shares, less than 3 percent, 
of the US market. Finally, the Bush administration 
excludes a batch of highly specialized steel products on 
the grounds that they cannot be produced domestically 
in sufficient quantities. A USITC commissioner esti-
mates that the safeguard tariffs cover 29 percent of US 
steel imports by volume (Hillman 2002). The safeguard 
duty rates are scheduled for reductions in March 2003 
and 2004. Table 1 summarizes the original and reduced 
duty rates.
June 2002: The WTO establishes a panel to hear the 
case of eight complainants: the European Union, Ja-
pan, Korea, China, Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand, 
and Brazil.
Summer 2002: The Bush administration grants ad-
ditional product exclusions in batches throughout the 
summer of 2002, in addition to the product exclusions 
granted in March 2002.2 Altogether, 3.5 million short 
tons’ worth of steel exclusions are granted, covering 727 
products and constituting 25 percent of the tonnage 
covered by Bush’s Section 201 remedy.3 Half the prod-
uct exclusions (measured by volume) cover unfinished 
steel imported by US steel firms for further process-
ing. In the first year of steel safeguards, tariffs covered 
approximately 45 percent of steel imports within the 
safeguard categories, both by tonnage and by value.4 
Taking exclusions into account, safeguard tariffs cover 
24 percent of total US steel imports by volume, 31 per-
cent by value.5
July 2002: Trade promotion authority (TPA) receives 
final approval in the House and Senate, and the bill is 
signed into law on August 11. In the House, TPA passes 
by only three votes, 215 to 212, including the critical 
support of many members of the Congressional Steel 
Caucus.
May 2003: The WTO panel rules against the US 
safeguard remedies for all 10 types of steel imports. 
The nearly 1,000-page panel report and decision finds 
multiple faults in the USITC reasoning that led to the 
remedies’ imposition.
August 2003: The United States appeals the panel’s 
decision to the WTO Appellate Body. The Appellate Body 
is supposed to deliver its decision within 90 days of 
August 11. Most observers expect the Appellate Body to 
substantially uphold the panel’s decision.
September 2003: The USITC issues two reports, total-
ing 890 pages, that evaluate the impact of the safeguard 
measures on steel producers and steel users. All sides 
claim that the USITC reports vindicate their preferred 
position.
Early 2004: If the United States does not revoke the 
safeguards after an adverse ruling from the Appellate 
Body, any prevailing complainant can take measures 
against US exports. There is, however, a lively legal 
dispute about whether prevailing complainants can act 
immediately by imposing “rebalancing” tariffs on US ex-
ports or whether they must seek authorization from an 
arbitration panel before imposing “retaliatory” tariffs.
1 No remedies were granted for tool steel and stainless steel 
fittings and flanges.
2 By March 31, 2003, the USTR had announced three lists of 
product exclusions; 513 temporary HTS subheadings identify 
products excluded from steel safeguard tariffs (USITC 2003a).
3 These calculations assume a base year of 2001. 
4 Calculated from USITC (2003a, appendix C). Estimate does 
not include stainless steel rod, for which import data were 
withheld. 
5 Calculations are based on data from USITC (2003a, appendix 
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In this policy brief, our fourth since steel safe-
guards first appeared on the horizon,2 we review the 
safeguard saga to October 2003 in box 1, speculate 
on the possible extent of trade retaliation or tariff 
rebalancing in the highly likely event that the WTO 
Appellate  Body  affirms  the  decision  of  the  WTO 
panel, and consider the impact of steel tariffs on 
US steel producers and steel users. Our speculation 
on retaliation or rebalancing presumes, of course, 
that the administration does not revoke the steel 
safeguards or offer alternative tariff concessions as 
compensation once the WTO Appellate Body has is-
sued an unfavorable ruling. 
The WTO Panel Decision
Those who disagree with the outcome of a WTO 
decision often attack the WTO dispute settlement 
system  without  bothering  to  address  the  spe-
cific legal issues in the case. The decision on steel 
safeguards is no exception. However, even casual 
knowledge of WTO agreements and prior WTO cases 
would suffice to expose flaws in the USITC’s original 
reasoning. Hence, analysts outside the US govern-
ment  and  steel  industry  widely  predicted  the  ad-
verse WTO panel ruling against the United States.3
The  panel  report  contains  more  than  5,000 
footnotes,  citing  as  precedent  over  50  previous 
WTO cases. Boiled to its essence, the panel found 
the  safeguards  were  inconsistent  with  WTO  rules 
for five reasons. (For each imported steel product 
covered by the safeguard, table 2 summarizes the 
violations the WTO cites.)
Increased imports. Under WTO provisions, an in-
crease in imports is a prerequisite to a finding of 
serious injury or a threat of serious injury. The US 
statistics failed to demonstrate that imports were 
increasing  for  five  types  of  steel  imports,  includ-
ing flat-rolled steel, which constitutes the bulk of 
domestic  production.  While  imports  of  flat-rolled 
steel and many other steel products increased for 
three or four years through 1998, they generally de-
clined from 1999 to 2001. Following the reasoning 
in previous WTO cases, the panel held that recent 
years should be given more weight when determin-
ing whether imports have increased, citing the text 
of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, which states 
a country can apply a safeguard only when a prod-
uct “is being imported into its territory in such in-
creased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic 
production, and under such conditions as to cause 
or threaten serious injury to the domestic industry 
that produces like or directly competitive products 
[emphasis added]” (GATT 1994b, article 2.1).
Unforeseen developments. The increased imports 
must be the outcome of developments trade negoti-
ators could not foresee when they agreed to the tar-
iff bindings in question. Negotiators are supposed 
to be smart enough to anticipate normal business 
cycle fluctuations and the prowess of foreign com-
petitors.4 Events beyond these common commercial 
occurrences  are  needed  to  justify  safeguard  rem-
edies. The WTO panel ruled that the USITC failed 
to  explain  how  the  increase  in  steel  imports  was 
the  result  of  unforeseen  developments.  The  best 
the United States could do was point to the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997–98, but that event cannot 
plausibly  explain  unforeseen  damage  to  the  steel 
industry two years later.
Causation. Before a country resorts to safeguards, 
it must show not only that the domestic industry is 
suffering but also that an import surge was the pri-
mary cause of the injury. The panel ruled that the 
USITC failed to demonstrate that imports were the 
primary cause of serious injury to the US industry 
for nine of the ten steel products the remedies cov-
ered. Other factors contributed to problems in the 
US steel industry, and the WTO panel concluded 
that the USITC did not adequately disentangle these 
factors. We discuss some of them in the penultimate 
section.5
Divergent  findings.  Each  of  the  commissioners 
made  an  independent  decision  as  to  whether  tin 
mill  and  stainless  steel  wire  should  be  grouped 
2 The preceding three are listed in the authors’ biographies and 
the references.
3 Hufbauer and Goodrich (2003a), for example, accurately an-
ticipated the panel’s reasoning.
The US statistics failed to demonstrate 
that imports were increasing for five types 
of steel imports constituting the bulk of 
domestic production.
4 It is debatable whether the long-term structural decline of 
integrated steel producers was foreseeable. However, the USITC 
did not cite structural decline as a rationale for safeguard tar-
iffs.
5 See Hufbauer and Goodrich (2003a, 2002, 2001) for more 
detailed analyses of structural factors that have undermined 
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Table 1. Original and reduced safeguard duty rates (percent)
Product First year Second year Third year
Flat-rolleda 30 24 18
Tin mill 30 24 18
Hot rolled bar 30 24 18
C-F bar 30 24 18
Rebar 15 12 9
Welded tubular 15 12 9
Fittings / flanges 13 10 7
SS bar 15 12 9
SS wire 15 12 9
SS rod 8 7 6
a. The remedy for slab was a tariff-rate quota rather than an increase in duties.
Source: USITC (2003a).








Flat-rolled X X X X
Tin mill X X X X X
Hot rolled bar X X X X
C-F bar X X X
Rebar X X X
Welded tubular X X X
Fittings / flanges X X X
SS bar X X X
SS wire X X X X X
SS rod X X X
Note: X indicates violation of a WTO condition for imposing safeguard tariffs.
Source: WTO (2003b).Number PB03-10 October 2003 5
with other steel products when making an injury 
determination.  For  example,  two  commissioners 
grouped  tin  mill  with  flat-rolled  steel  products  in 
finding  injury.  However,  of  the  four  commission-
ers who considered tin mill as a separate product, 
three found no injury. Nevertheless, President Bush 
considered this split decision an affirmative injury 
finding.6 The WTO panel said this was unreason-
able since the votes of the six commissioners were 
“irreconcilable.”
Parallelism.  WTO  panels  have  ruled  in  previous 
cases  that  if  imports  from  country  X  (typically  a 
free trade agreement partner) are not subject to the 
safeguard remedy, they should not have been con-
sidered in the determination of injury. Accordingly, 
the panel ruled that the United States should have 
excluded  steel  imports  from  Canada  and  Mexico 
from the injury investigation if the remedies were 
not to be applied to these imports. The postdetermi-
nation communication between the USTR and the 
USITC on this issue was deemed inadequate; the 
USITC did not explicitly evaluate whether steel im-
ports from Canada and Mexico were a more impor-
tant cause of injury than steel imports from other 
countries.
  While  the  WTO  Appellate  Body  will  almost 
certainly modify some of the findings in the panel 
report,  it  is  extremely  unlikely  to  exonerate  the 
United  States.  Often  the  Appellate  Body  narrows 
the scope of a panel’s decision without affecting the 
bottom line. In this case, the panel found five inde-
pendent violations of WTO rules and then exercised 
judicial restraint by putting aside additional legal 
issues—which could well have been decided against 
the United States. Hence, the chances for steel safe-
guards to withstand WTO review seem remote. This 
is particularly true for flat-rolled products, where 
the bulk of political pressure lies.
WTO Procedures and Arbitration Precedents
The WTO has authorized retaliation against a 
noncompliant country only five times in its eight-
year history.7 Of these, three cases involved subsi-
dies rather than border restrictions (such as safe-
guard or antidumping duties). In most WTO cases, 
either the winning country is satisfied with a moral 
victory and does not seek retaliation even if the of-
fending country fails to comply or the losing coun-
try abides by the WTO decision. With this sparse 
record, it is hazardous to predict exactly how much 
the prevailing parties will seek in penalties against 
US exports. Also, because of the novel circumstanc-
es of this case, it is uncertain when the prevailing 
complainants  can  take  action—immediately  after 
the Appellate Body rules against the United States 
or  not  until  the  arbitration  panel  determines  the 
appropriate extent and timing of authorized retali-
ation. 
The European Union has signaled its intent to 
impose  “rebalancing  tariffs”  on  the  United  States 
within five days of an adverse Appellate Body ruling. 
Since the European Union and other complainants 
seem determined, it is appropriate to consider the 
potential damage to US exports if the United States 
refuses to withdraw its safeguard remedies in this 
event. To further our inquiry, we first look at the 
rules governing WTO proceedings and four arbitra-
tion precedents. We then consider the events sur-
rounding a previous safeguards case that did not 
result in authorized retaliation.
WTO Procedures
Once the Appellate Body issues a decision, the 
judgment is final. The European Union claims the 
unilateral right to rebalance without further WTO 
authorization  under  Article  8  of  the  Safeguards 
Agreement.  Under  the  agreement,  countries  that 
impose a safeguards tariff are normally permitted 
a three-year grace period before affected exporters 
can ask for relief—either through negotiated tariff 
concessions on other products or through their own 
rebalancing tariffs. The European Union claims that 
this grace period is forfeited once the Appellate Body 
rules that steel safeguards do not comply with the 
Safeguards Agreement.8
The  United  States  might  well  take  a  different 
view.9 The United States could assert that the rules 
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) do 
not  allow  retaliation  unless  an  arbitration  panel 
authorizes  the  measures.  The  United  States  can 
6 Under US law, a 3-3 decision can be considered an affirma-
tive injury finding. The legal issue is whether it is inappropriate 
for the commissioners to group a product in mutually exclusive 
ways when casting a vote. The same problem arose with stain-
less steel wire.
7 These cases are, Canada—Export Credit and Loan Guarantees 
for Regional Aircraft, United States—Tax Treatment for Foreign 
Sales Corporations, Brazil—Export Financing Program for Air-
craft, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale 
and Distribution of Bananas, and European Communities—Mea-
sures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones).
8 The European Union took a similar stance in the case United 
States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat 
Gluten from the European Communities. In this case, rebalanc-
ing measures were imposed, and the United States requested 
consultations against them. However, before either the new case 
could be heard or a “reasonable period of time” had passed, the 
United States allowed the initial safeguards to expire, and the 
European Union lifted the rebalancing measures.
9 The steel industry has endorsed this alternative.Number PB03-10 October 2003 6
cite Article 14 of the Safeguards Agreement, which 
states that the DSU rules govern all disputes over 
safeguards.  To  resolve  the  potential  US-EU  dis-
agreement, the legal question for the Appellate Body 
is whether measures taken by prevailing complain-
ants  are  “rebalancing”  or  “retaliation”  measures. 
These are uncharted waters for the WTO, and no 
one is certain which side will prevail.10
The United States could sidestep this debate by 
offering compensation to the complainants in the 
form of lower tariffs (on a most-favored nation, or 
MFN, basis) for other imported goods. (The menu 
of  goods  and  the  extent  of  tariff  reduction  would 
be  determined  by  negotiation.)  But  losing  coun-
tries in GATT and WTO disputes have seldom used 
the compensation option because it creates severe 
domestic political problems.11 If the United States 
does not offer compensation and does not rescind 
the safeguards, the complainants will move forward 
with rebalancing or retaliation through steep tariffs 
on an appropriate amount of US exports—normally 
100 percent for retaliation, perhaps a lesser level for 
rebalancing.
Assuming the safeguard tariffs are found to be 
illegal, the United States and the eight complain-
ants will likely disagree as to what constitutes ap-
propriate  countermeasures.  The  European  Union 
and other complainants will advocate rebalancing; 
the United States will likely insist that countermea-
sures be limited to authorized retaliation. If the Eu-
ropean Union carries out its threat of rebalancing, 
the United States would have to initiate a WTO chal-
lenge against the height and breadth of rebalancing 
tariffs. In this case, the rebalancing measures—like 
the  safeguards  themselves—will  be  in  force  while 
the case is heard.12 The WTO’s lengthy decision pro-
cess will then work against the United States, and 
it is unlikely that the case will be resolved before 
the  safeguard  measures  expire.  However,  if  only 
retaliatory measures are sought, then an arbitra-
tion panel would have to decide what retaliation is 
appropriate. Under this scenario, it could be several 
more months before the panel approves retaliatory 
measures.
Sooner or later, it seems likely that a WTO panel 
will evaluate the countermeasures imposed against 
steel safeguard tariffs. Although it applies in the US 
legal system, the doctrine of stare decisis does not 
explicitly apply in the WTO.13 WTO panel determina-
tions are not bound by past decisions in the dispute 
stage or the arbitration stage. In practice, however, 
panelists  are  mindful  of  precedent  and  often  cite 
past decisions in their reports. The safeguard com-
plainants  would  strengthen  their  legal  footing  by 
relying on past cases when selecting their remedies. 
Thus  it  is  worth  reviewing  arbitration  precedents 
from the DSU system, even though the steel tariffs 
might  be  entirely  resolved  as  a  rebalancing  issue 
under the Safeguards Agreement.
Bananas
The Safeguards Agreement requires that rebal-
ancing  measures  be  “substantially  equivalent”  to 
the initial safeguard action. While no prior case has 
determined  the  meaning  of  “substantially  equiva-
lent” in the context of safeguards action, the con-
cept resembles the WTO rule for retaliatory sanc-
tions under the DSU: “The level of suspension of 
concessions or other obligations shall be equivalent 
to the level of nullification or impairment (of benefits 
to the exporter due to the WTO inconsistent mea-
sure).” (GATT 1994a, article 22.4) This sentence was 
first tested in a 1999 case between the European 
Union  and  the  United  States  (joined  by  Ecuador) 
over the European Union’s restrictions on banana 
imports.  The  arbitrators  established  the  following 
methodology for determining the “equivalent level” 
of retaliation:
7.1  To  estimate  the  level  of  nullification  or  im-
pairment,  the  same  basis  needs  to  be  used  for 
measuring the level of suspension of concessions. 
Since the latter is the gross value of US imports 
from the European Communities, the comparable 
basis for estimating nullification and impairment 
If the United States does not offer 
compensation and does not rescind the 
safeguards, the complainants will move 
forward with rebalancing or retaliation 
through steep tariffs.
10 Inside US Trade (“Trade Experts Clash over Validity of EU 
Steel 201 Retaliation Threat,” October 3, 2003) details likely 
competing arguments and the uncertainty that the surrounds 
the character of countermeasures.
11 The domestic import-competing industries that lose their 
tariff protection will bitterly ask, “Why should we pay for steel 
safeguards?” Moreover, since the tariff reductions are done on 
an MFN basis, inevitably third countries will benefit that were 
not parties to the complaint against the steel safeguards.
12 See Maruyama and Eckert (2003) for a discussion of WTO 
procedures in the event that a safeguard is found not to adhere 
to the Safeguards Agreement. 
13 Stare decisis is the doctrine that, once a court lays down a 
principle of law, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to 
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in our view is the impact on the value of relevant 
EC imports from the United States (rather than 
US firms’ costs and profits, as used in the US sub-
mission). More specifically, we compare the value 
of relevant EC imports from the United States un-
der the present banana import regime (the actual 
situation) with their value under a WTO-consis-
tent  regime  (a  “counterfactual”  situation).  (WTO 
1999, paragraph 7.1)
Beef Hormones
The notion of a counterfactual was also used in 
a simultaneous 1999 case that the United States 
and Canada brought against the European Union’s 
prohibition of beef imports from cattle treated with 
growth  hormones.  To  determine  the  appropriate 
level of US and Canadian retaliation, the arbitration 
panel  asked  the  simple  question:  What  would  be 
the value of US and Canadian exports of hormone-
treated beef to the European Union if the European 
Union had complied with the Appellate Body’s deci-
sion before the reasonable period expired? The an-
swer was made somewhat easier because the Euro-
pean Union had an import quota on beef. The panel 
assumed that the United States and Canada would 
fill their quotas and then deducted the current value 
of hormone-free beef exports to calculate the value 
of hormone-treated beef exports that would occur if 
the European Union had rescinded the ban.
Foreign Sales Corporation
In 1999, the European Union launched a com-
plaint against US tax preferences for exporting firms 
(the  foreign  sales  corporation  or  FSC  legislation). 
The complaint characterized the FSC regime as a 
prohibited export subsidy, and the European Union 
prevailed in the WTO (Hufbauer 2002). In response, 
the United States replaced the FSC regime with the 
Extraterritorial Income Exclusion (ETI) Act. In Jan-
uary 2002, the Appellate Body ruled that the ETI, 
like its predecessor, conferred a prohibited export 
subsidy. 
In the arbitration proceeding that followed, the 
European Union argued that it should be permitted 
to retaliate up to the full value of the US tax subsidy, 
estimated at $4 billion annually, without having to 
prove that EU exporters were harmed to the tune of 
$4 billion under the WTO’s Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures Agreement. In other words, even 
though the FSC/ETI boost to US exports might be 
small and in any event was distributed across all 
destinations for US exports, the European Union, as 
the sole complainant, sought authorization to retali-
ate against $4 billion worth of US exports, the total 
value of the illegal subsidy.
The arbitration panel agreed with the European 
Union’s  claim.  The  panel  determined  that  WTO 
rules do not tie the appropriate level of countermea-
sures to the adverse trade effect of the subsidy on 
the complainant. This represented a departure from 
the reasoning in the beef hormones case, which per-
tained not to a subsidy but to a border barrier. The 
panel in the FSC case seems to have concluded that 
prohibited subsidies represent a particularly repug-
nant violation of WTO norms.14 Since the European 
Union  was  the  sole  complainant,  the  arbitration 
panel gave it the right to retaliate up to the full value 
of the US subsidy. The panel took an ambiguous po-
sition on the appropriate level of countermeasures 
for the hypothetical case of multiple complainants. 
On one hand, the panel said that it might be inap-
propriate for the European Union to retaliate against 
$4 billion of US exports annually if there had been 
multiple complainants, but the panel went on to say 
that its ruling did not preclude other countries from 
bringing a WTO challenge against ETI law. 
The  European  Union  and  other  complainants 
might  attempt  to  apply  the  FSC/ETI  arbitration 
panel  reasoning  in  the  steel  safeguard  case.  In 
a  worst-case  scenario  for  the  United  States,  the 
arbitration  panel  would  permit  each  of  the  eight 
complainants to retaliate up to the full value of US 
worldwide steel imports lost due to, or covered by, 
the safeguard remedies. However, we are skeptical 
that an arbitration panel would reach this result, 
both  because  safeguards  and  subsidies  are  ad-
dressed in different WTO agreements and because 
In a worst-case scenario for the United 
States, the arbitration panel would permit 
each of the eight complainants to retaliate 
up to the full value of US worldwide steel 
imports lost.
14 The arbitration panel in Canadian Aircraft II (WTO 2003a) 
summarized the US-FSC decision and commented that the 
arbitrator in US-FSC concluded: “Not only is a Member entitled 
to take countermeasures that are tailored to offset the original 
wrongful act and the upset of the balancing of rights and obliga-
tions which that wrongful act entails, but in assessing the ‘ap-
propriateness’ of such countermeasures—in light of the gravity 
of the breach—a margin of appreciation is to be granted, due to 
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the FSC/ETI arbitration decision implied that pro-
hibited export subsidies pose a special offense to 
the WTO system. Further, we doubt that the Euro-
pean Union or other countries claiming rebalancing 
rights would impose tariffs on a larger value of US 
exports than the amount of their own steel exports 
covered by safeguard tariffs. Rebalancing tariffs in 
excess of that benchmark would appear to be a dec-
laration of trade war.
Canadian Aircraft II
Canada and Brazil have each accused the other 
of subsidizing the production of civil aircraft. In the 
most recent phase of this long-running dispute, the 
WTO Appellate Body found that Canada was provid-
ing a prohibited export subsidy. In May 2002, after 
Canada made it clear that it did not intend to com-
ply, Brazil requested authorization to retaliate. The 
arbitration  panel  authorized  Brazilian  retaliation 
against Canadian exports worth up to 120 percent 
of the value of Canada’s subsidy. By authorizing re-
taliation in excess of 100 percent of the subsidy, the 
arbitration panel added a punitive element to the 
countermeasures. In justification, the panel liberal-
ly cited the arbitration decision in the FSC case and 
came to conclusions that would not bode well for 
the United States if applied to the steel safeguard 
case.15 Again, however, we doubt that the reasoning 
in a prohibited subsidies case would carry over to a 
safeguards case. 
Wheat Gluten
In 1998, after a USITC investigation, the United 
States placed safeguard quotas on wheat gluten im-
ports from the European Union, Australia, and oth-
er  countries,  restricting  imports  to  58,000  metric 
tons. The Appellate Body ruling, issued in Decem-
ber 2000, dealt with issues similar to those posed in 
the current steel dispute. In the wheat gluten case, 
the Appellate Body ruled that the USITC investiga-
tion failed to demonstrate a causal link between the 
increase in wheat gluten imports and harm to the 
domestic  industry.  The  ruling  further  found  that 
the  United  States  inappropriately  included  Cana-
dian imports in the USITC’s investigation but failed 
to subject them to the resulting safeguard measures 
(WTO 2000). 
Five  days  after  the  Dispute  Settlement  Body 
adopted  the  Appellate  Body’s  findings,  the  Euro-
pean  Union,  claiming  the  right  to  rebalance—not 
retaliatory countermeasures—imposed a tariff rate 
quota of 5 euros per metric ton on the first 2.7 mil-
lion metric tons of corn gluten imported from the 
United States. Simultaneously, the European Union 
expressed its intent to pursue WTO-sanctioned re-
taliatory measures if the safeguard was not lifted. 
In  response  to  the  rebalancing  tariff,  the  United 
States requested consultations at the WTO, alleging 
that the tariff was inconsistent with the Safeguards 
Agreement.  On  June  1,  2001,  the  United  States 
allowed its wheat gluten safeguard to expire, and 
the European Union lifted its rebalancing measure 
against corn gluten, ending both cases.
Countermeasures Against US Exports
In the case of steel safeguards, the European 
Union has already drawn up a list of US exports 
worth  $2.2  billion  annually  for  potential  coun-
termeasures.  This  list  includes  Harley  Davidson 
motorcycles,  textile  products  from  the  southeast 
United States, and citrus products from Florida. In 
short, the list is designed to maximize the political 
pain for Republicans in 2004. 
The European Union arrived at the $2.2 billion 
figure by adding up the value of EU steel exports 
covered by the US safeguards rather than the value 
of EU steel exports lost on account of the US safe-
guards. The WTO has never used such a rationale 
in allowing retaliation in a border restriction case, 
but neither has it explicitly repudiated such a ratio-
nale. The European Union will no doubt argue that   
this more expansive method of calculating damage 
is necessary to restore the balance of concessions, 
and it will be up to the United States to prove the 
European Union wrong. Considering that there has 
never been an arbitration award for a safeguards 
case, nothing can be taken for granted.
Although the USITC did a variety of 
“sensitivity checks,” it should have done a 
“reality check.”
15 Consider this statement from the Canadian Aircraft II case, 
WTO (2003a): “In other words, we consider that countermea-
sures are there to contribute to the end of a breach. We also 
believe that the ‘appropriate’ level of countermeasures should 
reflect the specific purpose of countermeasures. Keeping this 
in mind, we are of the view that Canada’s statement that, for 
the moment, it does not intend to withdraw the subsidy at is-
sue suggests that in order to induce compliance in this case a 
higher level of countermeasures would be necessary and ap-
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A  commonplace  econometric  question  could 
be  asked  and  answered  about  steel  safeguards: 
What would be the value of a complainant’s steel 
exports to the United States if the safeguard were 
rescinded? However, no WTO arbitration panel has 
yet undertaken an independent econometric analy-
sis. Given this precedent, rather than venture into 
econometric analysis, we use algebra to get a handle 
on the level of retaliation that the WTO might au-
thorize. We present these calculations in appendix 
A. The calculations are designed to show both the 
value of steel exports lost on account of safeguards 
and the value of exports covered by the safeguards. 
Depending  on  the  favored  precedent,  counter-
measures  could  be  equivalent  to  exports  lost  or 
exports covered.
Table 3 shows the results under both the ex-
ports lost and the exports covered standards. Under 
the exports lost standard, $0.9 billion of US exports 
would be exposed to retaliation, with over 60 per-
cent of the retaliation coming from the European 
Union.  Under  the  exports  covered  standard,  $3.1 
billion of US exports would be exposed to retalia-
tion, with the European Union accounting for $1.9 
billion of the retaliation. Interestingly, this estimate 
of $1.9 billion in EU retaliation is fairly close to the 
$2.2 billion hit list that the European Union com-
piled over a year ago, which suggests that our rough 
methodology accurately captures EU sentiments at 
that time, even though the European Union used a 
less sophisticated method for determining harm.
Neither of our standards reflects the punitive el-
ement that colored the FSC/ETI and Canadian Air-
craft II arbitration awards. If the arbitration panel in 
the steel safeguards case can be persuaded—by the 
European Union or another complainant—that the 
reasoning of those two prohibited subsidies cases 
should apply to a safeguards case, then the arbitra-
tion award could exceed $3.1 billion. 
USITC Reports
On September 19, 2003, the USITC released its 
analysis of the steel safeguards. Two key questions 
that should be asked are 1) what have been the wel-
fare effects of the safeguards? and 2) what effects 
have  the  safeguards  had  on  consolidation  in  the 
steel industry? One could also ask about the state 
of the steel industry and what would happen if the 
safeguards were discontinued.
Welfare Effects of the Safeguards
The most useful part of the USITC reports is a 
CGE simulation of the steel safeguards. Although 
the USITC’s CGE model can be justly criticized, it at 
least attempts to avoid the post hoc ergo propter hoc 
fallacy. Unfortunately, the USITC did not conduct 
a similar analysis when it made its remedy recom-
mendations to President Bush in December 2001. 
This is a major problem with US safeguards law.
Under the baseline assumptions of the USITC’s 
model, the net effect of the steel safeguards is to re-
duce US welfare by $42 million annually. This figure 
is extremely small relative to the US GDP of almost 
$11 trillion.
However, the USITC’s calculation of net effect 
obscures the components that go into it. Most of 
the benefits of the steel safeguards go not to steel-
workers, nor even to steel producers, but to the US 
government in the form of increased tariff revenue 
Table 3. Scope for retaliation under two standards (millions of dollars)
Complainant Exports lost Exports covered






New Zealand 11 33
Brazil 30 107
Total 900 3,100Number PB03-10 October 2003 10
($650 million). Although the USITC did a variety of 
“sensitivity checks,” it should have done a “reality 
check.”16 In the 12 months following the safeguards, 
the US Customs Service collected only $581 million 
in duties from steel imports, which represents an 
increase of only $294 million (not $650 million) over 
the 12 months before the safeguard. Furthermore, 
the definition of steel used for this calculation in-
cludes products that are not even covered under the 
safeguard (USITC 2003b). 
The discrepancy in tariff revenue suggests that 
the USITC’s model understates the volume of steel 
imports that the tariffs have kept out of the United 
States. If so, then the safeguards have affected the 
domestic steel market to a greater extent than the 
USITC’s model indicates and the true economywide 
effects are understated. For example, the USITC’s 
model concluded that the average price of steel in 
the United States increased by 0.94 percent as a 
result of the safeguard. In Hufbauer and Goodrich 
(2003a), we estimated that the safeguards increased 
the  average  domestic  price  of  steel  by  1.3  to  5.1 
percent with a central estimate of 3.3 percent. Our 
central estimate is consistent with the conclusion 
that the USITC’s model understates the true econo-
mywide effects of the steel safeguard. We think our 
figure is preferable because it was estimated under 
relatively limited assumptions rather than being de-
rived algebraically in the style of CGE models, which 
require a great many assumptions.
We  turn  now  to  the  CGE  model’s  results  for 
the US manufacturing sector, which are probably 
understated  since  the  price  effect  is  understated. 
The  second  component  (after  the  increased  tariff 
revenue) of the USITC’s welfare change calculation 
is the change in labor income. The USITC reports a 
loss of $386 million, which implies that even if there 
has been an increase in employment in the steel- 
producing and upstream industries, the net effect 
of the safeguards on the US labor market was nega-
tive. This loss of $386 million is only 0.2 percent of 
labor income earned by durable goods production 
workers from April 2002 to March 2003. We do not 
know whether the income loss results from a reduc-
tion in average hours worked per employee or from 
a reduction in employed workers (perhaps partially 
offset by an increase in hours worked by retained 
employees). However, if the loss were entirely due 
to a reduction in employment in the durable goods 
sector, the effect of the safeguard would have been 
to  displace  over  12,000  production  workers  from 
their jobs.17
This  figure  should  be  considered  conservative 
(since  the  USITC  probably  understated  the  effect 
of  the  safeguard  on  domestic  steel  prices)  but  is 
roughly  consistent  with  our  previous  estimate  of 
26,000 jobs lost annually.18 Assuming our central 
estimate of the effect of the safeguards on steel pric-
es (3.3 percent increase) rather than the USITC’s 
estimate (0.94 percent), then the employment loss 
might be 43,000 annually, although a good portion 
of the reduction in labor income is probably due to 
cutbacks in hours rather than cutbacks in employ-
ment. Either way, the safeguards are bad for down-
stream wage earners.
The final component of the net welfare change 
calculation is return on capital (i.e., corporate earn-
ings),  where  losses  in  the  downstream  industries 
overwhelm the combined gains in the steel-produc-
ing and upstream industries by almost a 2 to 1 mar-
gin. The net earnings loss ($294 million) is probably 
understated, but it is still a loss. None of these wel-
fare figures are large relative to the total amount of 
tariff revenue collected, nor to the total employment 
in  durable  goods,  nor  to  the  total  profits  earned 
by  business.  However,  the  issue  is  not  whether 
the  steel  safeguards  are  catastrophic  for  the  US 
economy; the conclusion is that the safeguards are 
unambiguously a drag on the US economy.
Consolidation in the US Steel Industry
Proponents of the steel safeguards are quick to 
point out that consolidation has occurred in the US 
steel  industry  since  President  Bush  imposed  the 
steel safeguards. It is true that a round of consolida-
tion followed high-profile bankruptcies. Internation-
al Steel Group (ISG) purchased the assets of bank-
rupt firms LTV Steel, Acme Metals, and Bethlehem 
Steel; US Steel purchased National Steel’s assets; 
16 The sensitivity checks revealed that moderate changes in 
some of the model’s parameters resulted in a relatively large 
change in the final results. This finding will come as no surprise 
to anyone who has experience with CGE models.
The issue is not whether the steel safeguards 
are catastrophic for the US economy; 
the conclusion is that the safeguards are 
unambiguously a drag on the US economy.
17 The data on production workers, their hourly earnings, and 
their weekly hours were obtained from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (2003a).
18 See Hufbauer and Goodrich (2003a). Francois and Baugh-
man (2001) estimate using a CGE model that steel tariffs would 
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and the mini-mill firm Nucor acquired the assets of 
Trico Steel and Birmingham Steel. 
However,  virtually  everyone  agrees  that  more 
consolidation  is  needed.  More  important,  propo-
nents of tariffs never adequately explain how the 
safeguards  hastened  the  pace  of  consolidation. 
Instead, they simply assert a relationship between 
the  safeguards  and  consolidation.  This  statement 
by Wilbur Ross Jr., chief executive officer of ISG, in 
testimony to the USITC is typical:
The domestic industry generally and ISG in par-
ticular have used the temporary relief to adjust 
positively  to  import  competition  through  con-
solidation  of  production  facilities,  negotiation  of 
ground-breaking collective bargaining agreements 
that  have  brought  about  significant  improve-
ments  in  productivity,  new  capital  investments, 
and  other  measures.  None  of  this  would  have 
been possible in the absence of temporary relief. 
However, our work is not yet finished. ISG needs 
to  continue  to  invest  in  its  production  facilities 
to make them more cost-efficient. ISG needs the 
remaining time of temporary relief to complete its 
work so that we can compete with imports once 
relief is terminated (Ross 2003). 
We find it hard to believe that someone who has 
made as many billions as Ross fails to see the logi-
cal problems inherent in his statement. First, con-
solidation in the steel industry only occurs when a 
steel-producing firm is performing very badly and 
sells itself to a stronger firm. All of the consolidation 
that occurred in the steel industry since 1997 hap-
pened in the context of bankruptcy. In this sense, 
bankruptcy is a prerequisite to consolidation. By in-
creasing steel prices moderately, the Bush adminis-
tration may have propped up weak steel firms for a 
longer period, delaying consolidation.
Second, proponents of tariffs often say the in-
crease  in  steel  prices  due  to  the  safeguards  was 
necessary to finance capital investment. But capital 
investment can be the opposite of consolidation if 
old capacity is not permanently taken off line. In 
a previous policy brief, we estimated that the safe-
guards were responsible for only 39 percent of the 
increase in domestic steel prices, with the residual 
increase being mainly attributable to the reduction 
in  domestic  steelmaking  capacity  (Hufbauer  and 
Goodrich  2003a).  The  increase  in  domestic  steel 
prices due to the safeguards—whether 5.1 percent, 
3.3 percent, or 0.9 percent—was certainly not near-
ly enough to make or break a major investment. Of 
the major players in the recent wave of consolida-
tion, Ross entered the steel industry with billions of 
dollars from previous (nonsteel) business ventures, 
Nucor  can  issue  unsecured  bonds,  and  US  Steel 
has sufficient access to credit, even though its se-
nior unsecured debt is not considered investment 
grade (USITC 2003a, volume I, table Overview III-2). 
If the increase in steel prices augmented the cash 
flow of stronger firms, it would have a correspond-
ing effect on the value of the assets of weaker firms. 
In the course of consolidation, the stronger firms 
would therefore have to pay a higher price to the 
bankruptcy creditors of weaker firms. All in all, the 
main result of safeguard tariffs in the saga of steel 
industry consolidation was to put more money in 
the pockets of bankruptcy creditors—bank lenders 
and bondholders. 
Third,  proponents  talk  about  the  certainty  in 
steel prices that the safeguard supposedly engen-
dered. However, the safeguards did not make steel 
prices  more  certain;  depending  on  market  condi-
tions,  steel  prices  can  still  go  up  or  down.19  The 
only  thing  that  is  certain  is  that  steel  prices  are 
somewhat higher than they would have been in the 
absence of safeguards. Also, steel producers knew 
full  well  that  the  tariffs  would  last  at  most  three 
years, quite possibly less. Few in the steel industry 
are foolish enough to make a billion-dollar invest-
ment decision with a three-year time horizon. This 
is especially true since the safeguard tariffs covered 
only 31 percent by value of US steel imports.
Finally, steel producers such as ISG insist that 
the  safeguards  must  be  maintained  if  the  gains 
from  consolidation  are  to  be  realized.  But  there 
is no scenario at this point for the major firms to 
“unconsolidate”  back  into  their  component  parts. 
Future consolidation will entail the acquisition of 
small steel producers, since most of the teetering 
major producers have already been gobbled up. The 
only significant prospect for major consolidation is 
AK Steel: its stock price has plummeted from al-
most $15 to almost $2 per share since March 2003, 
while stock prices in the rest of the industry have 
Proponents of tariffs never adequately 
explain how the safeguards hastened the 
pace of consolidation. Instead, they simply 
assert a relationship.
19 Given the reduction in steelmaking capacity and the moderate 
upturn in the US economy, it was fairly certain that steel prices 
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rebounded. But AK Steel has historically been prof-
itable, does not appear to be on the verge of bank-
ruptcy, and may or may not be open to a merger. 
In any event, AK Steel does not support the safe-
guards, so there is no point in maintaining them for 
AK Steel’s sake.
The quotation from Ross underscores the real 
explanation as to why the consolidation occurred 
in  2002/2003—the  new  labor  agreement  with 
the  United  Steelworkers  of  America  (USWA),  the 
industry’s largest union. This labor agreement has 
been described as revolutionary because it permits 
workforce reductions of up to 40 percent, reduces 
job  classifications  from  30  to  5,  and  introduces 
profit sharing, among other provisions. This labor 
agreement allows ISG to operate the facilities for-
merly owned by LTV, Bethlehem, and Acme Metals 
more efficiently and forced US Steel to follow suit 
when it purchased National Steel. In fact, AK Steel 
actually made a higher bid for National Steel’s as-
sets but was unable to reach a labor agreement with 
the USWA, enabling US Steel to complete the pur-
chase. The chief executive and chief financial officer 
of AK Steel were recently pushed out because they 
were unable to reach a similar agreement with the 
USWA that would make their products competitive 
with the other integrated producers. In short, the 
labor agreement may not be the only thing, but it 
is critical.
More consolidation is needed. Despite the highly 
visible acquisitions of LTV, Bethlehem, and National 
Steel, the steel industry’s track record on consolida-
tion since the safeguards is underwhelming. Of the 
respondents  that  actually  answered  the  USITC’s 
Statistic March 2002 July/August 2003a Change
Imports by value 
(millions of dollars)b
1,017 952 -6.4%
Imports for consumption 
(thousands of short tons)b
2,778 1,864 -32.9%
Domestic shipments 
(thousands of short tons)b
7,874 8,701 +10.5%
Dow Jones steel share price index 87 64 -26.4%
After-tax profit as share of sales 
(percent)b
-3.8 -2.3 +1.5
Steel producer price index 97 105 +7.6%
Capacity (base year 1997) 109 110 +0.5%
Utilization rate (percent) 78 73 -6.6%
Average hourly earnings 
(dollars)
22 23 +6.0%
Steel producer employment 
(thousands)
107 101 -5.2%
Steel user employment 
(thousands)
4,016 3,766 -6.2%
Bankruptcies since 1997 (firms) 33 40 +7
Sources: USITC (2003c), Yahoo (2003), US Census Bureau (2003a, 2003b),  BLS  (2003a, 2003b), Federal Re-
serve Board (2003), and USWA (2003).
Note: Imports, producer employment, and producer price index data use NAICS 3311 (iron and steel and ferroal-
loys) definition of steel industry; capacity and utilization use NAICS 3311 & 3312 (steel product manufacturing) 
definition of steel industry; steel users are defined as industries listed in USITC (2003a, table 1-2).
a. July/August 2003 data are for the latest available month.        
b. Profits, imports, and shipments data are for first quarter 2002 and second quarter 2003. Imports and ship-
ments are expressed as a monthly average.
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survey on adjustment efforts (even though it was 
anonymous),  only  16  percent  reported  capacity 
reductions; only 23 percent reported mergers and 
consolidations; only 39 percent reported changes in 
pension liabilities, health care, and union contracts; 
and only 64 percent reported employee reductions. 
By contrast, 80 percent reported increased invest-
ment,  although  it  is  not  clear  from  the  survey 
whether these investments are intended to add new 
capacity or replace old capacity (USITC 2003a, vol. 
I, FLAT IV-6).
 
Current Condition of the Steel Industry
One of the USITC reports discusses the state of 
the US steel industry at length. There are three gen-
eral problems with the USITC’s methodology. First, 
the USITC recognizes that it is not legitimate to con-
clude that what has happened since the safeguards 
went into effect happened because of the safeguards, 
but aside from applying the CGE model, the USITC 
spends little effort attempting to overcome this post 
hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. Second, the USITC re-
lies heavily on survey data, despite warnings from 
social scientists that only those respondents with 
an axe to grind bother responding to voluntary sur-
veys, and those respondents frequently manipulate 
their answers.20 Third, the USITC restricts itself to 
analyzing data through March 2003. It avoids an-
swering  hard  questions:  How  are  steel  producers 
and  steel-using  industries  currently  doing?  What 
are their future prospects? And, given the answers, 
should the safeguards be continued?
For what they are worth, table 4 provides “be-
fore and after” statistics. Since the introduction of 
safeguards, US steel imports from countries subject 
to the tariffs have declined, although these declines 
were  partially  offset  by  increased  imports  from 
exempted  countries,  led  by  North  American  Free 
Trade Agreement partners Canada and Mexico. Ex-
clusions were concentrated on raw steel purchased 
by  the  domestic  steel  industry  itself  (e.g.,  slab), 
while imports for consumption by other industries 
dropped by about 33 percent. Owing to weak con-
ditions in the US manufacturing sector, domestic 
demand for steel in the past year declined. Never-
theless, the safeguards kept steel prices up even as 
the domestic industry increased production. 
Seven steel production or processing companies 
have  declared  bankruptcy  since  safeguard  tariffs 
went into effect on March 20, 2002.21 However, the 
number of workers employed by these seven newly 
bankrupted companies is small (8,500) relative to 
the  number  of  workers  employed  by  companies 
that went bankrupt between 1999 and March 2002 
(68,500). 
Steel users have shed jobs at a slightly faster 
rate  in  the  past  year  than  steel  producers.  Steel 
industry wages remain in excess of the average for 
durable manufacturing industries and rose 6 per-
cent between March 2002 and July 2003. Despite 
the safeguards, the steel industry is still unable to 
turn a profit.22 In the second quarter of 2003, the 
industry’s after-tax profit as a share of sales was 
–2.3 percent. This represents a small improvement 
over presafeguard losses. However, since the indus-
try remains unprofitable even with the safeguards 
in place, more consolidation is necessary. 
Multibillion-dollar  legacy  costs  of  retiree  pen-
sion  and  health  care  continue  to  loom  over  the 
industry,  keeping  the  average  cost  of  production 
high.23 These legacy costs, as their name implies, 
reflect past events in the industry, and safeguards 
do  not  greatly  affect  them.  The  USWA  has  made 
the preservation of current wage levels and benefit 
programs a priority in future collective bargaining 
agreements. The union is also committed to main-
taining  steelworker  employment,  although  it  has 
recently shown some willingness not to press too 
hard for this demand, which is mutually exclusive 
with other priorities. 
20 Evidence of manipulation of the USITC survey results has 
already been unearthed. Inside US Trade (“ITC Reprimands D.C. 
Lawyer for Issuing Tip Sheet to Steel User,” October 3, 2003) 
reported that the USITC has publicly reprimanded a lawyer for 
advising clients to exaggerate their companies’ injuries and job 
losses in response to the USITC questionnaire.
Steel users have shed jobs at a slightly faster 
rate in the past year than steel producers.
21 Two companies (National Steel and Calmut Steel) declared 
bankruptcy between the time the safeguards were announced 
(March 5, 2002) and the time they went into effect (March 20, 
2002), but they were well on their way to bankruptcy before-
hand. The seven postsafeguard bankruptcies are (in order of 
filing): Birmingham Steel, Cold Metal Products, Bayou Steel, 
Kentucky Electric Steel, EvTac Mining, Weirton Steel, and WCI 
Steel. See USWA (2003) for more information. 
22 The Dow Jones steel share price index is down by about 26 
percent since March 2002, mainly because of the drastic fall in 
the share price of AK Steel Holdings.
23 According to USITC (2003a, table Overview III-4), 12 steel 
producers’ pension plans have been taken over by the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) since 2001; these plans 
were underfunded by a total of $9 billion. USITC (2003a) calcu-
lates that steel industry pension plans and other postemploy-
ment benefits plans (OPEBs) are underfunded by $8 billion and 
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Conclusion: Statesmanship in Steel?
President Bush may soon have an opportunity 
for trade statesmanship, which will be sorely needed 
as the world digests the failed Cancún ministerial. 
If the WTO Appellate Body rules against the United 
States, President Bush should quickly revoke the 
safeguard duties. This action can be taken by ex-
ecutive order and does not require legislation. 
The  political  argument  against  revocation  is 
fairly  simple.  In  June  2001,  President  Bush  re-
quested  the  USITC  steel  safeguards  investigation 
with one eye toward congressional passage of TPA. 
In a cliffhanger vote in the House of Representatives 
in  December  2001  (215-214),  some  39  of  the  45 
House  Republican  members  of  the  Congressional 
Steel Caucus voted for TPA (Hufbauer and Goodrich 
2002). Several of these members were not known for 
their support of trade legislation, and some of them 
reside in closely contested districts. It can be argued 
that President Bush “owes them” to keep the safe-
guard tariffs in place through March 2005—both to 
satisfy a political debt and to ensure their support 
for free trade agreements that might be concluded 
in the next two years.24
Other political realities argue against continuing 
the safeguards. In the first place, some steel indus-
try lobbyists, drawing on the logic of post hoc ergo 
propter hoc, claim that safeguards have “worked.”25 
Knowledgeable  Capitol  Hill  observers  report  that 
some congressional Republicans from steel districts 
are prepared to declare victory and call it a day if 
the WTO Appellate Body rules against the United 
States. At that juncture, not only will congressmen 
representing steel users clamor for relief, but also 
congressmen representing districts targeted by EU 
24 FTA negotiations with Australia and Central America (CAFTA) 
are well advanced, and negotiations with Bahrain, Morocco, and 
South Africa have been initiated. The Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) conceivably will be concluded in 2005. 
25 Steel lobbyist Terrence D. Straub is quoted as saying, “If I 
were White House economists, I’d have to sit back, read this 
and be honest—the tariffs have worked” (“Tariffs Help Lift U.S. 
Steel Industry, Trade Panel Reports,” Washington Post, Septem-
ber 21, 2003, A12).
(and  other)  rebalancing/retaliation  measures  will 
demand that the safeguards be lifted.
Turning  from  politics  to  economics,  an  argu-
ment can be made that the steel industry has not 
returned to full health. At the same time, a more 
compelling  argument  can  be  made  that  the  steel 
safeguards have done more harm to the steel-us-
ing industries than good for steel producers. Tip-
ping the balance in the economic debate between 
domestic steel producers and steel users is the in-
ternational dimension. Steel safeguard tariffs have 
been widely criticized abroad for disregarding inter-
national norms. If they are ruled illegal, economic 
statesmanship calls for their removal. 
If President Bush and his advisers believe that 
the  steel  industry  needs  further  assistance,  they 
should spare domestic steel users and foreign steel 
suppliers and instead ask Congress to target relief 
on steelworkers, both active and retired. Safeguard 
duties boost the profits of well-run steel firms, and 
they ensure that creditors get paid more cents on 
the dollar when poorly run firms go bankrupt. But 
safeguard duties do little for steelworkers. Retired 
workers once employed by bankrupt firms have now 
lost hundreds of millions of dollars in pension and 
health benefits. Recently laid off workers are eligible 
for Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA). While the 
TAA program was improved in 2002 in the context 
of TPA, it is far from generous, and its terms should 
be further liberalized in the direction of “wage insur-
ance.”26
Steel policy choices made in the next few months 
could set the tone for trade debates nationally and 
internationally. The United States can show that it 
values the world trading system and respects WTO 
legal decisions, or it can defy an adverse WTO rul-
ing, endure trade retaliation, and further sour the 
climate for Doha negotiations.
26 Wage insurance is the concept of public compensation to 
dislocated workers for part of the difference between pay on 
the previous job and lower pay on the new job. See Kletzer and 
Litan (2001).Number PB03-10 October 2003 15
Appendix A. Determining the Effect of Safeguards
In the following four equations, we calculate a re-
sponse factor to estimate the effect on imports of a 1 
percent rise in the tariff rate and use this number to 
find the amount of exports lost by each of the com-
plainant countries, as well as the total amount of 
exports covered by the tariffs for each complainant. 
To do this, we exploit the fact that the safeguard 
tariffs  were  set  in  March  2002  and  then  phased 








For  each  of  the  10  steel  product  categories  (de-
noted by the subscript p) affected by the US steel 
safeguards,  we  first  calculate  a  product  response 
factor  (Fp)  that  roughly  measures  how  much  the 
value of imports of that product category changes in 
response to a change in tariff (T). To calculate this 
response factor, we first take the change in the val-
ue of imports (I) affected by the safeguard in 2003 
relative  to  2002.  Specifically,  we  look  at  imports 
for the months (m) April 2002 to July 2003 for the 
eight complainants (c) as a whole and divide by the 
percentage point absolute difference in tariff rates 
between 2003 and 2002 (%Tp
2002 – %Tp
2003).
This calculation, shown in equation (1), yields 
a coefficient that represents the average dollar in-
crease in imports of a steel product category from 
all  eight  complainants  for  each  percentage  point 
reduction in the tariff. This dollar coefficient is then 
divided by the dollar value of imports of that prod-
uct category from all eight complainants in the April 
to July 2002 period to yield that product’s response 
factor.
As the next step, we calculate a weighted average 
of the 10 response factors, weighting each product 
by the value of its imports. This is shown in equa-
tion (2). The resulting average response factor (F) of 
2 percent indicates that the value of steel imports 
increases by 2 percent for every percentage point 
reduction in the safeguard tariff. Most economists 
would deem this figure a conservative estimate. 
To  determine  the  level  of  retaliation  for  each 
complainant under the exports lost standard (Rc
Lost), 
we first take the base of imports in the April to July 
2003 period for each product and complainant and 
multiply  it  by  three  (to  annualize  a  four-month 
base). We then multiply it by the quantity 1 plus the 
response factor (F) and finally by the safeguard tariff 
on that product as of 2003. 
This  calculation,  shown  by  the  first  term  of 
equation  (3),  creates  a  counterfactual  value  for 
steel imports of that product for each complainant. 
From this counterfactual value, we then subtract 
triple the actual value of imports of that product 
from that complainant between April and July 2003 
(again to annualize a four-month figure) to obtain 
exports lost for each complainant and product. As a 
last step, we sum over the 10 products affected by 
the steel safeguard to obtain the level of retaliation 
for each complainant.
To  determine  the  level  of  retaliation  for  each 
complainant under the European Union’s exports 
covered standard (Rc
Covered), we use the same method-
ology, except that we do not subtract the annualized 
value of 2003 imports from the counterfactual value 
before summing over the 10 products. This calcula-
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